Mr. Chairman, I too had not considered before

making a formal opening statement, but I do have a couple of remarks to make.

I am disappointed. I have viewed the Speaker, regardless of who

the Speaker has been, as the Speaker of the entire Congress, not

one political party, the same as I view the Chairman of the Committee

as the Chairman of the Full Committee, not the Republican

Party. Therefore, I think it is regrettable that the Speaker has decided

and the Chairman has agreed and acquiesced to form indeed

what is a one-party view of a very serious foreign policy issue.

I cannot recollect one instance while the other party, my party,

had control of the House, where there was on a foreign policy issue

a one-party policy task force formed for partisan purposes. I don’t

know why you have a task force that has only one party and excludes

Democrats. It feeds into the theory that seems to be growing

that the Republicans have a partisan plan and that plan is just to

discredit the President and this Administration on any and every

foreign policy issue that it can, and that the Republicans have a

need to look at the world through rose colored glasses and find an

enemy that is red and, there being few, have singled out the obvious,

North Korea, and are going to come up with a partisan report

that is just basically going to discredit whatever policy is there,

whether it is right or wrong.

There are many of us on this side who are critical of the Administration

when criticism is necessary and try to view these very serious

issues as they are and call the shots as we see them and to

try to serve the people that we have been elected to represent to

the best of our ability in a nonpartisan way as Americans. There

should not be a Republican foreign policy, and there should not be

a Democratic foreign policy. I think that that is what this is leading to.

I think persons so distinguished as the Chairman of this Committee

and Representative Knollenberg, who appears before us

today, have their work immediately branded and labeled as a partisan

political attack, regrettably, even though there may be some

very good and important things involved in it. Some of us would

have liked to have had the opportunity to participate as American

Members of this American Congress with our Republican colleagues

in trying to determine what is good and what is bad about

our policy. Instead, we have a report that comes out because of the

way it is structured, as very tainted, and I think that is regrettable,

because there may be some very good things our colleagues have to share with us.

I thank you for the time.

Will the gentleman yield?

Will the gentleman yield?

If we want an honest nonpartisan discussion, I

think it should start with a nonpartisan investigation that includes

Members of both sides. How is it nonpartisan if only you guys get

to participate in the investigation or whatever it is that you did?

All we are saying is if you want to come up with a discussion that

is nonpartisan, well, deal us in, because otherwise it is just you

guys and that looks like it is partisan.

The other point, if I can say to my friend—if my recollection

serves me right, I was the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia,

the Committee on which you served. I cannot, maybe your memory

is a little better than mine, recollect a single instance where you

made a request or wanted something before the Committee that

was turned down by this Chairman.

So if you have any specifics, I would be glad to hear them. Just

saying something doesn’t make it so.

Would the gentleman yield? If it is addressed to

them, why don’t they just report to the Speaker? Why are they here?

Will the gentleman yield?

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I find it fascinating that the Speaker has appointed

a task force exclusively of Republicans to report to him a

Republican foreign policy rather than an American foreign policy

point of view, and to give him advice, and then to hear you state

that this is not a matter for a public hearing.

What do you call this room that we are in, that Mr. Knollenberg

and I presume Representative Cox and others are in right now, and

what is it we are conducting, if not a hearing? We received notice

late last night that in addition, suddenly, to having Dr. Perry testify

at this hearing, that with very little notice, and I have no objection

to that, it is your prerogative, that the task force will preempt

Dr. Perry and will report the task force’s findings to this hearing.

If this is not a hearing, and I don’t see the Speaker here, I see

us here, I see our Committee here, I see us in our hearing room

having a hearing in which the task force is reporting. If they are

not participating in the hearing, then this is Alice in Wonderland

and I just fell down a hole.

What policy is that?

You said ‘‘our.’’ I wanted to know if we were included.

Do we get to vote?

Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sure that we

will have sufficient time to engage the witnesses.

Mr. Chairman, we are just asking for the right

to respond or ask questions of the witnesses.

Because their time is up and we are not objecting to it.

Point of order, Mr. Chairman.

I believe the witness just impugned the integrity

of the Secretary, claiming a conflict of interest, and I think he owes

it to this Committee to give us the details and specifics of this investigation

that he has done. I am shocked to find that the Secretary

is engaged in these kinds of activities. I would like the gentleman

to put that before us.

I request that I be recognized next so I can speak consecutively with myself,

if that is OK, Mr. Chairman. His time and my time.

I will proceed now on Mr. Gejdenson’s time. I am

absolutely shocked and offended that the gentleman would besmirch

the reputation of a Secretary and imply that he is in this

to make a buck, and therefore our foreign policy is being tainted

because of his business interests. I wish the gentleman would

rethink the way that that sounds to the rest of us and perhaps——

Let me continue, and then you will have your

chance to respond. I am also kind of bemused, I guess, by your

characterization that the Administration, and I guess this is partisan,

but I am not allowed to say that, I suppose, is having a love

affair with North Korea. They are rascals, they are rogues, they

are everything the gentleman has said and more. But a sane and

sober policy toward that country and that part of the world and the

interests of U.S. security does not mean we have a love affair with

them, just because we are addressing serious security concerns in the region.

A moment of history, if you will. Five years ago last week, I undertook

to go to North Korea. I spent some considerable time there.

I met over a number of days with most of the high officials in the

government, including a very long and protracted meeting with

Kim II Sung. At that meeting, basically I developed an outline for

what became the Carter initiative. If the gentleman recalls, the

concern of the day was that the IAEA was being thrown out of

North Korea every other week, was kept waiting on the tarmac,

they were not going to be let in to inspect the reactors or what was

happening to the spent nuclear rods. The concern was that we

knew that the batteries and the film had probably run out in the

cameras that were on the locks that were there, that they may or

may not have known that, and that they may have been pilfering

and taking the spent nuclear rods and therefore enhancing their

nuclear weapons capability. That was our concern.

Our purpose was to try to get them to allow the IAEA back in

and to have some kind of reasonable security program so that the

world could rest assured that they would not go ahead with the

danger that they seemed to have.

During the course of those discussions, the thought was developed

that if they would do away with their heavy-water reactor—

the kind of reactor that allows for the production of nuclear fissionable

material—and switched it to a light-water reactor—light-water

reactors making it almost impossible to produce nuclear material

for bombs capability—that the world would be better off.

Kim II Sung suggested that the reactor would cost him $10 billion

at great sacrifice to the people. Negotiation began as to how

to get that money item off the table and to switch them so that the

IAEA could get back in, the cameras could be restored, and that

they would agree not to take the nuclear rods away and to switch to light-water.

Their concern was that they did not want to appear that they

were supplicants to South Korea. They wanted the international

community to step up to the plate instead of just South Korea. It

was conceived that the international community would mean the

Japanese, the South Koreans and the United States with minor

participation. Our participation would not be to supply anything

but fuel oil, because when they turned down their nuclear reactor,

they would have no capability to provide energy and heat for their

country during the cold winters. Our piece of the action was small

at the time, like $30 million. It has grown now to the Administration’s

request of $55 million. That is $55 million, and I think we

have budgeted $30 million, which you want to zero out completely.

Weigh that against the $1 billion the Japanese put up, the $3 billion

that the South Koreans put up—$4 billion, as opposed to our

$40 or so million, which means we put up 1 percent. You come before

us today with a new concern. That concern is no longer hey,

they are making nuclear fissionable material and stealing these

nuclear rods to produce bombs. Your concern, as Mr. Knollenberg

has placed it today, is hey, someone is stealing some of that fuel

oil away. I got news for you——

I would like to be recognized on my own time.

Point of order, Mr. Chairman. The Ranking

Member yielded me his time. I requested of Chairman Gilman the

right to speak on my own time, and nobody objected.

I ask unanimous consent to finish my thought.

May I finish my sentence?

I thank the Chairman. If the discussion of today

is that, hey, we are getting a bad deal and these bad boys—and

they are—are stealing some of that fuel oil, this is a whole different

discussion than hey, they are producing fissionable material that is

going to create bombs. I think this discussion is a lot more sane

and civilized, and to switch it from the fact they may be stealing,

and probably are, some of the fuel oil from civilian use, is a much

better discussion. We are in a much better place because of the success

of this policy rather than what the gentleman has proposed.

Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, are you impugning

the integrity of the Secretary, that he is over there to do business?

I thank the Chairman. I don’t intend to use all of the time.

The gentlemen have me at a disadvantage as I have actually

read part of the testimony of the next witness and therefore, do not

share their liberty of being able to characterize it in any fashion,

whether right or wrong. But I think we will hear from the Secretary,

because he does say, and I will quote from his prepared

statement, ‘‘unfreezing Pyongyang remains the North’s quickest

and surest path to nuclear weapons. U.S. security objectives may

therefore require the United States to supplement the Agreed

Framework, but we must not undermine or supplant it.’’

I think that is the opposite of the characterization that was made

concerning his report.

This is very, very serious business that we are up to. It is just

too bad we are not doing it in a nonpartisan way. Representative

Cox’s testimony before about this is just advice to the Administration

because it is a Democratic Administration and the Secretary

is a Democrat, and therefore, this is a Democratic policy. I served

under George Bush and I served under Ronald Reagan, and they

were my Presidents too, and we used to have an adage around here

that politics stops at the water’s edge.

When we leave the shores of the United States, we are all Americans.

We put on the same face. They don’t want to view us, and

neither should we want to be viewed, as this is the Democratic policy

or the American policy. When our President, whoever he was,

or is, spoke, he spoke for all Americans. This was America’s policy.

We shouldn’t characterize the Administration’s policy as the Democratic policy.

I don’t believe this President or anybody in this Congress, Democrat

or Republican, is in love with the Administration of North

Korea. They are condemnable. But the idea is what do we do about it?

There should be an American foreign policy, which is what the

President has, as opposed to a Republican foreign policy, which the

gentleman has proposed. Republican foreign policy should not be

anti-American foreign policy. But I think you feel compelled to do

that because you just want to be ‘‘anti’’ this particular President.

I think that is regrettable for us in the long run.

It is very disparaging, and it is very upsetting to a number of us

who think that these issues are bigger than our petty political careers

at the moment and what vantage point we can get individually

or as political parties. I think that is the path down which

we are being led. It is very, very unfortunate.

I think that, if I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, it is time to move

on and allow the Secretary what was supposed to be his day.

Mr. Chairman, I didn’t ask any questions. I just made my statement.

Reclaiming my time. I didn’t say that it was impossible.

I said it was near impossible. It is very difficult, and there

is absolutely no evidence that they are taking any of the spent nuclear

material. Your report didn’t study that. You are speculating

right now. Your report just dealt in your investigation, as I understood

it, as you explained to us, it just dealt with the fact that

some of the fuel oil—and I don’t even know what percentage of it,

and I surmise neither does anybody—might have been put aside for

official government or military use or whatever it was used for.

That is the factual material that you have put before us. Everything

else is just speculation and politics.